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AGENDA V.A. 
Joint Criminal Participation: Establishing 
Responsibility, Abandonment 
Paul Marcus* 
INTRODUCTION 
In the United States, three principal means are available to es-
tablish criminal responsibility in cases involving joint defendant par-
ticipation: attempt, aiding and abetting or accessory liability, and 
conspiracy. The three have very different roots, tracing back to the 
English common law. In today's world, they are prosecuted and ap-
plied in very distinct fashions. In this article I will explore both the 
basis for these crimes and the withdrawal from them, discuss the el-
ements present for each, and analyze the way that they differ in to-
day's world. 
While the backgrounds and elements for these three criminal 
theories are quite different, the test for withdrawal or abandonment 
from them are quite similar. In essence, we ask whether a criminal 
defendant may ever be able to withdraw from liability under these 
theories. If we allow such abandonment, we must then ask what 
proof must be offered, and by whom. We turn first, though, to es-
tablish viability. 
ESTABLISHING RESPONSIBILITY 
Attempt 
The crime of attempt has been an important part of the ap-
proach taken by prosecutors in dealing with acts of individual 
criminals as well as multiple criminals. It was developed in order to 
detect and deter crime at an early stage. Recognize, however, that 
enough must be demonstrated in order to make clear that the indi-
viduals truly planned to commit an anti-social act. Throughout the 
United States the two key elements of the offense are identical: a 
high state of mind, and an act taken to effectuate the object of that 
state of mind. New York law provides: "A person is guilty of an at-
tempt to commit a crime when, with intent to commit a crime, he 
engages in conduct which tends to effect the commission of such 
• Dean and Professor of Law, University of Arizona College of Law. 
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crime."1 
Before exploring these two elements of act and intent, it is 
worth noting that there is no distinct crime of attempt as such. 
There are only attempted substantive offenses. For instance, a de-
fendant may be held responsible for attempted murder or attempted 
robbery or attempted kidnapping. Thus, it is important to bear in 
mind that in addition to the elements of intent and act, the govern-
ment must also demonstrate a clear state of mind with respect to a 
completed crime which is the goal of the attempted conduct. Typi-
cally, however, that completed crime is self-evident in the goals of 
the actor. Thus, the two chief questions surround the necessary 
state of mind to be shown as well as the act in furtherance of it. 
Most states require that a very high state of mind be satisfied 
before the defendant can be held responsible for an attempt. 
Whatever the state of mind for the completed offense, most courts 
will require the government to demonstrate a "specific intent" for 
the attempt. The rationale for this is that with so little action neces-
sary for the attempt, the prosecution should demonstrate unques-
tionably a culpable state of mind. Thus, while the crime of rape in 
most states is classified as a "general intent" crime not requiring any 
high degree of proof regarding the defendant's mental state, attempt 
to commit rape "is commonly referred to as a specific-intent crime, 
since it requires proof of intent other than the mere doing of an 
act."2 
The states of mind at common law were denominated specific 
intent and general intent; in today's world most jurisdictions are 
somewhat more precise in defining these mental states. Thus, in 
many jurisdictions the "highest" mental state required is that of in-
tent (as opposed to knowledge, recklessness, or negligence). This in-
tent requirement establishes the need to demonstrate a particular 
goal or purpose in addition to knowledge of consequences. In most 
states, the mental state required for an attempt is intent. This point 
is extremely important, for individuals may be held responsible for 
completed criminal· acts involving less than intent, but can only be 
held for the attempted crime with a showing of this high state of 
mind, intent. For example, in Moore v. Alabama,3 the court raised 
the following famous question: 
[I]f one from a house-top recklessly throw[s] a billet of 
wood upon the side-walk where persons are constantly pass-
ing, and it fall[s] upon a person passing by and kill[s] him, 
this would be, by the common law, murder. But if instead 
1. New York Penal Law§ 110.00. 
2. Sanchez v. Wyoming, 567 P.2d 270, 275 (1977). 
3. 18 Ala. 532, 534 (1851). 
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of killing him, it inflicts only a slight injury [could the party 
be convicted of attempted murder]. 
481 
The answer to the question raised in Moore is clear. An individ-
ual can be held responsible for common law murder without intent 
being shown, under the traditional implied malice standard of reck-
lessness (conscious disregard of a substantial risk). That same indi-
vidual could not, however, be found guilty of attempted murder if 
the victim were not killed, because the necessary mental state for at-
tempted murder would be an intent to kill, not present in the case 
put forth by the court. 
Most litigation in the attempt area has surrounded the question 
of the type of act required for the crime. In earlier days, courts re-
ferred to relatively minor acts which could satisfy the requirement 
so long as a showing of intent was present. Indeed some states con-
tinue to apply this rule, in statutory form. For example, in Nevada, 
by state law, an attempt is an act done for the purpose of commit-
ting an offense, "intending but failing to accomplish it."4 Most states 
have, however, recognized the need for a greater showing of an act 
requirement even with the high state of mind element. The prevail-
ing view today is the definition suggested by the American Law In-
stitute's Model Penal Code. Section 5.01 of the Code provides, in 
material part, that the necessary element is "an act . . . constituting 
a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his 
commission of the crime." 
While numerous cases arise in which the chief question is 
whether the step taken is a substantial one, typically these become 
issues of fact for the trier of fact and are disposed of as with other 
evidentiary questions. See, for example, a recent Arizona case in 
which the defendants approached the victim and asked him for help 
in starting their car. The victim accompanied them to a distant 
parking lot where one of them said "All we want is that wallet in 
your back pocket. If I hit you, I'll kill you." The victim then ran 
away and found a police officer who arrested the defendants. The 
court held that the statements made by the defendants were suffi-
cient to constitute a substantial step and affirmed their convictions 
for attempted robbery.5 
Aiding and Abetting 
Attempts and conspiracy are crimes to which criminal penalties 
attach. The doctrine of aiding and abetting, sometimes referred to 
as accessory liability or accountability, is quite different. It is no 
crime to be an aider and abettor or an accessory. Rather, aiding and 
4. Nevada Revised Statutes § 208.070. 
5. Arizona v. Dale, 590 P.2d 1379 (1979). 
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abetting is a theory of criminality which allows the government to 
impose liability for crimes which have been completed because this 
defendant assisted others in such completion. At common law, this 
system was well established with three distinct categories for such 
parties to the crime. A principal in the first degree was the person 
at the scene of the crime who committed one of the elements of the 
criminal offense. A principal in the second degree was also at the 
scene of the crime; she, however, did not commit the crime, she as-
sisted in the commission of the crime such as by acting as lookout. 
Finally, an accessory before the fact provided aid to the principals 
but this person was not at the scene of the crime and often was the 
key person who engaged in the planning prior to the event. 
These categories of parties were well settled for centuries in 
both England and in the United States. In modern times these cate-
gories raised difficult substantive questions in one primary area, in-
consistent verdicts. That is, if the defendant was charged with 
aiding and abetting another person in the commission of a crime 
what would the result be if that other person were found not guilty 
of the crime. The point was finally settled by the United States 
Supreme Court in 1980. 
In Standefer v. United States 6 one defendant, a public official, 
was acquitted of the crime of receiving a bribe from Standefer. 
Standefer was then convicted, in a separate trial, of aiding and abet-
ting the unlawful receipt of a gift by that public official. The public 
official, of course, was the very same person who had been found not 
guilty of the crime of receiving those same gifts.7 The defendant re-
lied on a line of cases which indicated that "where the only potential 
principal has been acquitted, no crime has been established and the 
conviction of an aider and abettor cannot be sustained."8 The 
Supreme Court, however, dismissed this argument. The Court rec-
ognized the intellectually attractive idea of consistency, but rejected 
it in a system which gave great weight to individual jurors in sepa-
rate cases. 
This case does no more than manifest the simple, if discom-
forting, reality that "different juries may reach different re-
sults under any criminal statute. That is one of the 
consequences we accept under our jury system." While sym-
metry of results may be intellectually satisfying, it is not 
required.9 
Within the last twenty years, many states have rejected the 
6. 447 u.s. 10 (1980). 
7. Id. at 13. 
8. United States v. Shuford, 454 F.2d 772, 779 (4th Cir. 1971). 
9. 447 U.S. at 25. 
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common law classifications of various principals and accessories. 
They instead have focused on two chief elements in determining 
whether an individual ought to be held responsible for assisting an-
other in the commission of a crime. As in the area of attempt, a 
high state of mind is required along with some specific act. The re-
cently proposed revised federal criminal code provides, in part, that 
a defendant can be "convicted of an offense based on the conduct of 
another person if ... with intent that the offense be committed, the 
defendant knowingly commands or aids ... that other person to en-
gage in conduct." Thus, once again, the courts are faced with the 
twin dilemmas already presented in attempt: has the prosecution 
demonstrated a high "specific" intent, and what short of act is re-
quired for the crime. 
It is not enough for the government to demonstrate that the de-
fendant was aware of an ongoing criminal activity and knowingly 
provided aid to that activity. Rather, the standard is a more difficult 
one. The government must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that it 
was the defendant's goal or purpose-her intent-to have that crime 
committed. This point was made clear in Washington v. Glad-
stone.10 The defendant there knew that a friend of his was in the 
business of selling marijuana An undercover police officer came to 
the defendant and asked him where he could buy marijuana. The 
defendant simply directed this officer to his friend's home. When 
the sale was made the defendant was convicted of aiding and abet-
ting the sale of marijuana from the friend. The Supreme Court of 
Washington reversed the conviction finding that there was no proof 
of an aiding and abetting. Quoting the famous judge, Learned Hand, 
the court noted that for a conviction in this area to be affirmed it 
must be shown that the defendant "in some sort associate himself 
with the venture, that he participate in it as something that he 
wishes to bring about, that he seek by his action to make it succeed. 
All the words used-even the most colorless, 'abet'-carry an impli-
cation of purposive attitude towards it."11 
In many cases in which responsibility is based upon an aiding 
and abetting theory, there is little question but that the defendant 
has provided sufficient aid. The individual who supplies plans, 
weapons, or vehicles, clearly intends to provide support and has 
given very material assistance. In some cases, however, the difficult 
aid question is put at issue. For instance, in a federal case the only 
evidence against the defendant in connection with a counterfeiting 
scheme was that he accompanied the counterfeiter to the printing 
shop on several occasions. The court there noted that such evidence 
10. 474 P.2d 274 (1970). 
11. Id. at 278. 
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was not clearly sufficient to impose liability and that the jury would 
have to be instructed "with extreme precision" so that a finding of 
guilty would not be based upon mere presence and knowledge on 
the part of the defendant.12 In some cases, however, mere words 
may be sufficient to sustain a conviction under an aiding and abet-
ting theory. In a number of the tax resistance cases only words 
were established. That is, in these cases, individuals counseled, ad-
vised, and encouraged other individuals to falsely report information 
on income tax returns so as to cripple the Internal Revenue Service. 
The courts rather consistently hold that such activity is sufficient as 
demonstrating a culpable intent and as providing important support 
to those filing improper tax returns.13 
One final point should be raised in connection with the theory 
of aiding and abetting. If the defendant has been shown to have in-
tentionally provided aid to another in the commission of a possible 
crime, the defendant will be found guilty of the same offense for 
which the other individual can be found guilty. If, however, that 
other defendant commits some other crime-different from the one 
intended by the defendant-the defendant may in some cases also be 
found guilty of that crime. See, for instance, Michigan v. Poplar 14 
where the government demonstrated quite clearly that the defend-
ant and his friends intended to break into a recreation building. In 
connection with the entry the manager of the building was shot by 
one of the defendant's friends. The defendant during this period 
stayed outside the building acting as a lookout. He argued that he 
should not be found guilty of the crime of assault with intent to 
commit murder for he had not intentionally provided aid for that 
crime; instead his aid only went to the breaking and entering. The 
court rejected the defendant's argument in applying standard Amer-
ican law. It decided that the jury, under the circumstances, "could 
properly conclude that the use of the gun was fairly within the scope 
of the common unlawful enterprise and that the defendant was 
criminally responsible for the use by his confederates of the gun."15 
Conspiracy 
In the United States the most popular way of establishing joint 
criminal participation is through the use of the conspiracy charge. 
Conspiracy is both a common and an unusual crime. It is common at 
every stage of the criminal prosecution and in virtually all jurisdic-
tions. It is unusual because it is often charged even when a principal 
12. United States v. Garguilo, 310 F.2d 249, 254 (2d Cir. 1962). 
13. See, e.g., United States v. Buttorff, 572 F.2d 619 (8th Cir. 1978). 
14. 173 N.W.2d 732 (1969). 
15. Id. at 735, 736. 
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crime has been attempted, or where the defendant could otherwise 
be held responsible either for a completed crime or for aiding and 
abetting another in the crime. Indeed, it will even be charged where 
multiple defendant liability creates unduly complex problems for 
the trier of fact. Many reasons have been offered as to the popular-
ity of conspiracy. For many practitioners in the criminal justice sys-
tem, however, the reasons for the prevalence of the charge can be 
linked directly to the great advantages created for the government 
in charging conspiracy. That is, in a conspiracy case, multiple de-
fendants and multiple charges can be joined in one prosecution. 
Under a broad view of venue, the case can be brought in any juris-
diction in which any conspirator took any act in furtherance of the 
conspiracy. Finally, evidentiary advantages may be present in a con-
spiracy setting which would be particularly important to the govern-
ment, such as the admission of declarations made by co-conspirators 
in furtherance of the conspiracy. 
The crime of conspiracy serves two distinct purposes. One is to 
allow early intervention by the government into criminal endeavors, 
much the rationale given for the crime of attempt. In addition, it 
allows the government to intervene in dangerous joint criminal ac-
tivities because "collective criminal agreement-partnership in 
crime-presents a greater potential threat to the public than individ-
ual delicts."16 
As with both attempt and the theory of accomplice liability, the 
government must demonstrate an act in furtherance of a very high 
mental state. The crime of conspiracy is denominated a "specific in-
tent" crime; in modern terminology it is viewed as a crime requiring 
the government to prove that the defendant intended the crime. 
What is different about conspiracy, however, is that this state of 
mind is broken into two very different parts. First, the defendant 
must intend to enter into an agreement with other individuals. Sec-
ond, the defendant must intend that-with the other defendants-a 
particular crime shall be committed. In some cases, it is very diffi-
cult for the government to prove that both portions of this state of 
mind requirement have been satisfied. See, for instance, fllinois v. 
McChristian, 17 where the defendants were gang members in the city 
of Chicago. A rival gang drove by and someone shouted something 
about "getting them." After shots were fired and members of the ri-
val gang were injured, the defendants were charged with conspiring 
to murder members of that gang. The court concluded that no in-
tent had been shown to enter into an agreement. Even more impor-
tantly, no sufficient evidence had been brought forth to demonstrate 
16. Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593 (1961). 
17. 309 N.E.2d 388 (1974), aff'd, 322 N.E.2d 804. 
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that the defendants intended to murder the victims as part of that 
agreement. 
The heart of the crime of conspiracy is the agreement. Without 
an agreement at common law there could be no conspiracy. Never-
theless, in many cases it is extremely difficult for the government to 
prove by direct evidence that an agreement was formed. Hence, 
courts consistently allow jurors to infer from circumstantial evi-
dence that an agreement was reached. This is important both as to 
the proof of the agreement and the scope of the plan. For instance, 
in Direct Sales Co. v. United States 18 a pharmaceutical manufacturer 
was convicted of conspiring with a doctor to distribute drugs unlaw-
fully. There was no evidence of any specific agreement, but officers 
in the company knew that the doctor was distributing far more nar-
cotics (which he bought from the company) than he could lawfully 
distribute. The court concluded that the jury could well find that 
the officers in the company intended to participate in this unlawful 
enterprise and that the sale of the drugs was itself an agreement. 
See also the famous case of United States v. Bruno 19 where multiple 
parties were charged with conspiring to import, sell and possess nar-
cotics. Some of the defendants were the importers, some were the 
"wholesalers", some were the "retailers" of the drugs. In essence, 
they argued that they had never agreed with all of the other parties 
to distribute the narcotics and hence could not be joined together in 
a single conspiracy prosecution. The court rejected this view finding 
that each member of the conspiracy knew that the success of the en-
tire agreement was dependent upon the participation of various indi-
viduals. Even though the defendants did not know the identity of 
each and every individual, they knew such persons had to be present 
and thus were responsible for their activities. 
A recent trend in the United States would expand the liability 
for an individual under conspiracy theory even when no true agree-
ment is present. This is referred to as the unilateral approach to 
conspiracy and is best illustrated by a Minnesota case. In that case 
the defendant conspired with his cousin to kill his mother. The 
cousin, however, had no true intention of committing the murder 
and was simply acting as a spy for the police. The Supreme Court of 
Minnesota nevertheless found that the defendant was guilty of con-
spiracy because he intended to agree with the cousin to commit the 
murder and he believed that an agreement had in fact been 
reached.20 Therefore, under the unilateral approach to conspiracy, 
the court focused attention only on the defendant's state of mind 
18. 319 u.s. 703 (1943). 
19. 105 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1939), rev'd on other grounds, 308 U.S. 281. 
20. Minnesota v. St. Christopher, 232 N.W.2d 798 (1975). 
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and ignored the question of whether a true agreement had been 
shown. 
The scope of the crime of conspiracy is quite broad, particularly 
when the crime which is the object of the agreement has been com-
pleted. In many jurisdictions, if the crime is completed the defend-
ant may be convicted of both the completed crime and the crime of 
conspiracy and may be given consecutive sentences for these two of-
fenses. This is in sharp contrast to the crime of attempt which is 
typically said to "merge" into the completed offense. In the situa-
tion in which the attempt is satisfied as well as the completed crime, 
the government must normally choose which of the two offenses to 
charge. In the conspiracy setting, however, the crimes are viewed as 
distinct, because of the uniquely dangerous aspect of group criminal 
behavior in the agreement. As in the area of aiding and abetting, 
the conspirator may also be held responsible for crimes committed 
by others even if those crimes were not discussed or intended by the 
defendant as part of the agreement. In the important case of Pin-
kerton v. United States,21 the United States Supreme Court held 
that all conspirators could be found criminally liable for all crimes 
committed by co-conspirators, so long as those crimes could "be rea-
sonably foreseen as a necessary or natural consequence of the un-
lawful agreement."22 
WITHDRAWAL FROM CRIMINAL PARTICIPATION 
Two very different questions must be raised in connection with 
the abandonment or withdrawal by criminals in connection with il-
legal activity. The first is whether the defendant can withdraw after 
she has taken sufficient act to constitute a crime. For example, will 
the defendant be responsible once a substantial step has been taken 
when that step would satisfy the act element of an attempt. The 
second question is whether the withdrawal by the defendant will 
limit the scope of responsibility under aiding and abetting and con-
spiracy theories. At common law, the answers to both of these ques-
tions were clear. 
The traditional rule has been that once the elements of the 
crime have been satisfied no withdrawal is permitted. In California 
v. Staples 23 the defendant took a number of steps in an attempt to 
commit burglary of a bank. He rented a room above the bank, 
purchased tools for drilling, and actually began drilling through the 
ceiling in an attempt to enter the bank. Prior to any detection by 
others, however, the defendant-a mathematician-realized that his 
21. 328 u.s. 640 (1946). 
22. /d. at 648. 
23. 85 Cal. Rptr. 589 (1970). 
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plan was "absurd" and stopped all efforts to complete the burglary. 
The court, nevertheless, upheld his conviction for attempted bur-
glary. The traditional view on this point was stated by the court. 
Once that attempt is found there can be no exculpatory 
abandonment. One of the purposes of the criminal law is to 
protect society from those who intend to injure it. When it 
is established that the defendant intended to commit a spe-
cific crime and that in carrying out this intention he com-
mitted an act that caused harm or sufficient danger of 
harm, it is immaterial that for some collateral reason he 
could not complete the intended crime.24 
The rule was applied similarly in aiding and abetting and con-
spiracy settings. So long as the government demonstrated the ele-
ments of the offense, the crime was complete and no abandonment 
was possible. While, as we shall see, the rule has changed in recent 
times, that traditional rule has always been in contrast with that of 
the responsibility for other completed offenses. In the situation in-
volving conspiracy in which an agreement was reached and some-
time after the agreement another crime was completed, the 
defendant could be relieved of responsibility for that other crime if 
it was shown that he had withdrawn from the conspiracy. This rule 
makes sense because there would be no aid under the accomplice 
theory, or agreement under the conspiracy, if the defendant was no 
longer present when that completed crime was shown. Hence, in 
these situations, the defendant could still be liable for the underly-
ing crime, but could not be held responsible for crimes committed 
after the withdrawal. 
Many jurisdictions today reject the traditional view that one 
cannot withdraw from the attempt, the aiding and abetting, and the 
conspiracy when all the elements for proof of the crime have been 
satisfied. These legislatures and courts take the view that we ought 
to encourage the withdrawal of defendants and that the affirmative 
defense of abandonment is needed to promote that encouragement. 
Typical of this view is a recent draft of the proposed revised federal 
criminal code. 
It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under the title 
for attempt that, under circumstances manifesting a volun-
tary and complete renunciation of the defendant's criminal 
intent, the defendant avoided the commission of the crime 
attempted ... 
In all three settings-attempt, aiding and abetting, and conspiracy-
many courts today allow for the effective withdrawal of responsibil-
24. Id. at 594. 
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ity. The difficult question then relates to the proof which the de-
fendant must offer in order to sustain the burden of showing 
voluntary withdrawal. It is clear that in most cases it will not be 
enough for the defendant to prove that he simply decided not to en-
gage in criminal behavior any longer. Especially when other crimi-
nal participants are involved, the burden on the defendant is 
greater. 
Most cases hold that the defendant's withdrawal burden is a 
two-fold responsibility. First, the defendant must act in a timely 
fashion so that others who might continue to participate in the crim-
inal activity will be advised of his withdrawal and may themselves 
be encouraged to withdraw. Second, the defendant cannot simply 
advise other participants that he is no longer engaged in the activity. 
Instead, he must "take affirmative action to disavow or defeat the 
purpose, or definite, decisive and positive steps which indicate a full 
and complete disassociation."25 In addition, the defendant must 
demonstrate that his motives for abandonment or withdrawal were 
proper. Thus, it is not enough to demonstrate withdrawal when the 
police find out of the activity, or the officers are in hot pursuit of the 
defendant. Similarly, the abandonment would not be successful 
"when the defendant fails to consummate the attempted offense af-
ter deciding to postpone the criminal conduct until another time or 
to substitute another victim or another but similar objective."26 
The basic point of allowing withdrawal is to encourage the elim-
ination of crime where governmental detection is not yet possible. 
Therefore, the modern rule allowing withdrawal as a defense is 
sound. Even though the necessary elements of these crimes may 
have been completed, if the defendant voluntarily withdraws out of 
a sense of remorse, his culpability has been eliminated, his criminal 
responsibility should also be eliminated. The traditional view of not 
allowing abandonment for attempt, aiding and abetting, and conspir-
acy may soon become the minority rule, and properly so. 
CONCLUSION 
In the United States, it is quite common to see criminal prosecu-
tions for attempt, aiding and abetting, or conspiracy where there are 
several participants in the commission of a crime. The elements of 
these three theories are quite different, though in some cases all 
three crimes can be shown. Each imposes responsibility for a partic-
ular intended crime in itself; in addition, in many cases other crimes 
may be attributable to the defendant because of his guilt as an aider 
and abettor or a conspirator. While courts have been reluctant in 
25. Harris v. United States, 377 A.2d 34, 38 (D.C. Ct. App. 1977). 
26. Michigan v. Kimball, 311 N.W.2d 343, 349 (1981). 
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the past to allow withdrawal from responsibility for attempt, aiding 
and abetting, and conspiracy that view is changing rapidly. In to-
day's world, in an effort to encourage abandonment of criminal ef-
forts, more and more judges and legislators are viewing the defense 
of withdrawal as an important aid in the fight against crime. 
